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Resentment and Assurance 
Margaret Urban Walker 
Resentment is a kind of anger. It is widely agreed that resentment predicates some 
kind of wrong at others' hands and that it is in some way a defensive emotion in 
its operation or its manner of expression. The most widely cited contemporary 
account of resentment, Jean Hampton's, renders the anger, wrong, and need for 
defense in a particularly colorful way. I Hampton's is an individualistic and agonis-
tic account of resentment. Beings acutely aware of their "value and rank" are 
moved to anger by injuries to themselves that challenge their presumed standings, 
and they are mobilized in fearful defense of the self-esteem these standings under-
write. Hampton uses this agonistic picture to make resentment itself look some-
what shabby and misguided , a defensive reaction based on dubious views that 
one's own human worth can actually be diminished by others ' actions. 
An older account of resentment paints a more social and less self-referring 
picture of it. In his sermon "Upon Resentment," Joseph Butler describes "deliber-
ate anger or resentment" in this way: 
The natural object or occasion of settled resentment then being injury, 
as distinct from pain or loss; it is easy to see, that to prevent and to 
remedy such injury, and the miseries arising from it, is the end for which 
the passion was implanted in man. It is to be considered as a weapon, 
put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice, and cruelty.z 
Butler viewed deliberate resentment, when not groundless, extravagant or venge-
ful, as "one of the common bonds, by which society is held together; a feJlow-
feeling, which each individual has in behalf of the whole species.") It is that by 
which "Men are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow-creatures by fear" 
Ythen virtue would not suffice.4 
I argue that resentment is a versatile and economical emotion that serves the 
~~ation of shared lives pervaded by norms and the expectations to which they 
I'Ve nse. Shared life requires mutually recognized boundaries and fairly reliable 
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expectations based on them. Responses that target violations and prompt violators 
to reconsider and to beware or those that signal the need for this sort of action 
are thus important, and resentment plays, I argue, this sort of role.s Occasions of 
resentment are in fact many and more varied than either Hampton 's or Butler's 
discussions would suggest. I claim that what best explains the extent and variety 
of possible occasions for resentment is that resentment responds to perceived 
threats to expectations based on l1om7S that are presumed shared in or justly author-
itative for common life. In some cases resentment also responds to experienced 
threats to one's standing to assert or insist upon those norms. Possibilities for re-
sentment are many because the field across which intelligible resentments range 
is as broad as that of behavior to which norms are taken to apply. This range of 
behavior includes table manners and modes of dress and address, as well as styles 
of life and social interaction and matters of justice and basic decency among 
human beings. While resentment registers anger at threats to expectations under-
lain by norms, or to one 's standing as a competent judge of operative norms, it 
targets others' intentional acts as the source of threat and tends to impugn their 
motives and attitudes. Resentment is an accusing anger, one that calls others to 
account, as P. F. Strawson argued in calling resentment a "reactive" attitude that 
attributes responsibility6 But at the same time, as I explain below, resentment not 
only sends a message but also invites a response: it seeks assurance from offenders 
or from others that they can be (or be again ) trusted to reaffirm and respect the 
boundaries that norms define, boundaries that offer protection against harm or 
affront, as well as the security of membership and reliable expectations in a com-
munity of shared normative judgment. 
I see my account as being in the spirit of Butler's, endorsing his insight into 
the deeply social and expressive aspects of resentment. Butler's characterization 
of resentment as a "fellow feeling" is multiply apt. Resentment extends to injuries 
or exclusions of those one takes to be one 's fellows, but it can also forge a sense 
of fellowship where it had not been felt before. In addition , it can be prompted 
by threat to one's sense of belonging with others in a community of judgment 
that shares standards. When Butler speaks of resentment as a "weapon" against 
injury, injustice, and cruelty, however, he not only draws the defended territory 
too narrowly but is also sanguine about our equal entitlements to bear and bran-
dish these emotional "arms." And he is hasty in supposing that the effects of so 
doing are likely to be uniform or as intended. Attention to a fuller array of exam-
ples will help to show this. 
It is Hampton 's more widely known contemporary analysis, however, that I 
will examine first, using limitations in her account to draw out features of my own 
view. To be clear at the outset: I don't take Hampton (or Butler) to be attempting 
an account of necessary and sufficient conditions of resentment, nor do I attempt 
one. I take it that Hampton's account, as does my own, aims at a "normal form" 
characterization of a syndrome of feelings and expressions that in certain kinds of 
contexts is likely to be identified as resentment. I believe the grammar of emotion 
terms is somewhat rough and ready. This means that not much is settled simply 
by butting intuitions about individual cases against one another. Our emotion 
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vocabularies are not that neatly regimented, and whether someone is willing to 
call one scenario or another a case of resentment is not so significant as the 
reasons that we are inclined to describe cases in that way or in some other way. 
Descriptively, the point is to achieve a characterization that covers the widest class 
of common cases and, better still, that sheds light on why contested examples 
cause disagreement. Explanatorily, a plausible account should make sense of the 
roles that the experience and expression of the emotion play in our shared lives . 
The view I develop here is meant to address those descriptive and explanatory 
challenges. The question of when resentment is justified and deserves to receive 
the satisfaction it seeks is not my topic here . 
Getting Resentment in Broader View 
For Hampton, resentment "is an emotion whose object is the defiant reaffirmation 
of one's rank and value in the face of treatment calling them into question in 
one's own mind. '" In her view, resentment serves at once as a protest and defense.s 
The occasion of resentment for Hampton is "being wronged," which is not only 
being damaged or hurt but also being so in a way that "insults" or is "disrespectful 
of" one's worth, however that is conceived (e.g., as relative or absolute or fixed or 
variable).9 "Resentment," she says, "is an emotion which reflects their judgment 
that the harmful treatment they experienced should not have been intentionally 
inflicted on them by their assailants insofar as it is not appropriate given their 
value and rank.,, 10 A resentful victim of wrongdoing is thus angry-more particu-
larly "defiant" or "battling" against the lower standing imputed to him or her by 
the culpably disrespectful harming. 1l But at the heart of resentment, Hampton 
sees something defensive in another sense; she believes its angry defiance reveals 
a fear. It is feared that the offender is right to think that the victim's worth is as 
implied in the insulting treatment or that it is permissible to lower the victim in 
rank by means of such an action ("putting her in her place,,).lz So resentment 
combines anger and fear. 
Hampton draws a distinction between resentment and indignation, claiming 
that indignation is an impersonal anger at a challenge to "someone's value," 
which threatens a standard of value, whereas resentment is personal anger and 
defends oneself "against the action's attack on one's self-esteem" and is "normally 
an emotion experienced only by the one who has been harmed."13 One's self-
esteem is threatened by the possibility that the action has revealed one is or has 
now been made lower in rank or value than one was or had assumed. 
So, for her, the occasion of resentment is being culpably wronged. The con-
stitutive belief in resentment is that one's deserved or true rank and value have 
been impugned or imperiled. The feeling of resentment embodies anger at insult 
and its implications and fear that one's status is lowered or one's diminished status 
is revealed. The object or aim of resentment is to defend and protect self-esteem. 
Hampton's view of resentment is narrow in several ways. Consider her limita-
tion of resentment to reactions in defense of oneself when it is oneself who is 
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wronged. This seems implausibly restrictive, for we commonly enough speak of 
resentment at the way others are treated or looked at, nor must these others be 
ones with whom we have personal connections or prior identification. One can, 
looking on, resent a sales clerk's rude treatment of a shabbily dressed person, the 
condescension of a teacher to a girl in a physics class, or the self-congratulatory 
attitude of a wealthy political candidate who is discussing problems of "the poor" 
when these actions involve or refer to strangers or groups to which one does not 
belong. Furthermore, the distinction Hampton makes between supposedly imper-
sonal indignation and allegedly personal resentment is unconvincing. Diners 
badly served their suppers or employees failing to receive their anticipated bo-
nuses may be the very type of the indignant individual. So indignation is quite 
commonly a reaction to injuries to oneself taken very personally indeed, whereas 
resentment can just as well take the cause of others to heart. Resentment and 
indignation, in fact, may not be distinct emotions; in the modern but older usage 
of Butler (or Adam Smith), the two are not distinguished and the terms are used 
interchangeably, as when Butler spoke of resentment as "the indignation raised 
by cruelty and injustice ." But even without settling the precise nature of the differ-
ence between indignation and resentment, I think there are enough examples to 
confute the alignment of resentment and indignation, respectively, with what is 
"personal" and "impersonal" or what concerns "self" and "other" for reasons I 
expand below. No doubt to resent something is to "take it personally," but the 
sense in which this is true remains to be spelled out. 
Hampton wants to see resentment and indignation as distinct but parallel, 
with resentment as the personal version and indignation as the impersonal version 
of angry fear at wrongdoing. But this doesn 't seem to work either, for straightfor-
ward cases of indignation don't seem to be marked by the fearfulness that Hamp-
ton, and not she alone, associates with resentment. The indignant person is char-
acteristically the picture of confident or unreserved righteousness. For that matter, 
not all cases of resentment seem to involve fear. A gentleman who is spoiling for 
a fight may coolly brandish his resentment at an insult as a provocation to a 
contest-say, a duel-he has little fear of losing. A dominating husband may re-
sent and expressly avow resentment of his wife 's wage earning, confidently and 
correctly surmising that the fact of his resentment will cause her to quit her job. 
Yet the term "resentment" seems tinged for many people with associations of 
someone cringing or sulking in gnawing and roiling anger that is tamped down 
or turned inward, as if out of fear. I have no doubt that Nietzsche's memorable 
creation of the image of ressentiment-a kind of seething, angry envy of the power-
ful by the powerless, who must nonetheless hang back in their despicable weak-
ness-has had an impact, and not only on philosophers. But it is well to remem-
ber that Nietzsche is not talking about resentment in any commonplace sense. 
He coins a novel term of art to advance an imaginative scenario in which morality 
itself emerges as a kind of brilliant trick of the weak, who remain nonetheless 
despicable in their weakness. The fictional Nietzschian drama is propelled by 
what we would more usually describe as envy of the superiority of the strong. 14 
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I return below to some ways in which resentment can be inflected by envy 
or fear, as also by disgust or bitterness, and to some reasons that resentment is apt 
to be differently inflected for those in positions of relative weakness. But the exam-
ples above of the insulted but confident gentleman or the successfully dominating 
but irritated husband, as well as a very broad array of cases of resentment at offense 
that [ discuss shortly, suggest a different explanation of what prompts resentment. 
What is central to resentment on this explanation is a perceived threat, whether 
or not one has reason to fear what is threatened and whether or not one in fact 
does fear it. A threat suggests a prospect of damage to or loss of something valued, 
and people can get angry at the suggestion that someone is inclined to act in a way 
that might damage or get in the way of what they count on or deem important, even 
if they have no fear of heading off the t11feat. The sometimes in-turned or tamped 
quali ty of resentment in many cases may have more to do with the position the 
resenting one is in: one is not always in a position to give forthright expression to 
one's anger at a perceived threat. The nature of the display of this kind of anger is 
sensitive to the position-situational, emotional, social, and institutional-one is in 
to show how one feels or to anticipate a desired response to that display.15 
Another questionable claim in Hampton 's account is that resentment is a 
strategy aimed at defending self-esteem (or "self-respect," which she uses inter-
changeably in this context) . This seems to require that a resenting person has 
some modicum of self-esteem to defend. She says that "the abili ty to feel resent-
ment following a wrong-doing depends upon one's having enough sense of one's 
own worth to believe that the treatment is inappropriate and worthy of protest.,, 16 
Similarly, Jeffrie Murphy, her interlocutor in Forgiveness and Mercy, holds ex-
pressly that resentment defends one 's self-respect and that proper self-respect is 
essentially tied to resentment, so that "a person who does not resent moral injur-
ies done to him ... is almost necessarily a person lacking in self-respect."17 Yet 
there is a lot of everyday evidence that people need not hold themselves highly, 
indeed, not respect or esteem themselves at a basically decent level, to be great 
resenters. Self-abasing flatterers , cringing self-despisers, and miserable sellouts, or 
people beaten down or those consumed with self-hatred of their powerlessness, 
are quite capable of resentments, including resentment of others to whom they 
self-abasingly bow or of others who maintain dignity or integrity under circum-
stances similar to their own. Unless one wants to award the honorific "self-respect" 
to anyone who won't bridle at something, it seems resentment need not imply self-
respect in even a modestly positive sense. On the other hand , whereas resentment 
is possible and common for those who fail to respect themselves, those who en joy 
robust self-respect may be magnanimous or respond with confidence or determina-
tion rather than resentment, even when they are themselves treated ill or are the 
object of neglect or undeserved indifference. Self-respect, then, is not obviously 
either necessary or sufficient for experiencing resentment when threatened or 
even when injured or affronted. 
Finally, it is questionable to narrow the response of resentment to harmful 
and insulting treatment intentionally inflicted. This description calls up vivid im-
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ages of abusive or disrespectful treatment that would make one wince to observe, 
as well as to suffer. Cases like this surely merit resentment if any do. But this 
identification of occasions for resentment with damage and injury both pushes 
aside the pervasiveness of resentment in everyday life and tends, misleadingly, to 
moralize it. Resentment is often provoked by the good, generous, fair , or even 
simply decent treatment of others when the resentful one feels convinced that she 
would not have fared as well or perhaps remembers an instance in which she did 
not, or when she thinks that it is she and people like her, and not those others, 
who are entitled to the treatment or rewards in question. And there is also the 
familiar case of charged and evident resentment felt in response to those perceived 
as exceeding their places, prerogatives, and authority, those who are "uppity," 
"arrogant," or "too big for their britches." They seem to illustrate that it can be 
just as threatening to see some others claim respect and receive good or dignifying 
treatment as it is for oneself to be shown to the lower rung of the status ladder. 
More surprising, perhaps, is the extent to which resentment arises at the behavior 
of others that simply upsets established patterns and expectations. 
Resentment and Threat 
My objection to Hampton's view is not that she has not identified and explored 
insightfully the ways in which resentment results from perceived injuries that are 
insults to status (her "rank and value") . My objection is that she has ignored the 
broader field in which being demeaned by being treated below one's status consti-
tutes one kind of occasion for resentment that can be placed within a more gen-
eral account. Here I make a start on that. 
In my view, resentment is best explained as a defensive response of anger 
(and in some but not all cases, fear or other negative feelings) to others' inten-
tional actions perceived as violating boundaries defined by norms. Sometimes the 
violation is an actual injury, but even then it is not only the harm caused but also 
the sense of wrongfulness of the behavior causing the harm that is characteristic 
of resentment (in distinction to other kinds of anger, which may arise from frustra-
tion or thwarting that need not issue from another human agent or can be di-
rected at human agents whose motives we need not impugn). The wrong is de-
fined by some supposed rule or standard, a norm . The constitutive belief is: they 
should not have acted in that way. Strawson points out that the pain may be as 
unpleasant in a case in which someone treads on my hand accidentally as when 
one does so out of contempt, but it is the latter case that is ground for resentment 
because of "the very great importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions 
toward us of other human beings."lB But before we get so far as attitudes and 
intentions, notice how various are perceived wrongs to which resentment is a 
response. 
Resentment is occasioned not only by harms and losses, as when one is as-
saulted, cheated, made to suffer, or forcibly relieved of one's goods, but also by 
cases in which some ride free or manipulatively profit in excess ways from roles, 
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systems, or cooperative practices in which others comply without extra profit; call 
these exploitations.19 Resentment can also be provoked by someone's assuming a 
position or being treated as entitled to a status that disturbs a presumed status 
ordering; call these improprieties. If the disturbance makes the resenter's position 
or status lower or less valuable than it had been or than he or she believed it to 
be, we might call these demotions . Then there are cases in which one endures 
treatment beneath his or her proper status-slights. Finally, resentment is often 
enough prompted by rule breaking, norm violating, or simply behavior seen as 
"out of bounds," even without evident profit to the violator or harm or expense to 
others; call these offenses. These are things "not done" or "unacceptable ." Harms, 
losses, exploitations, improprieties, demotions, and slights may be my own or oth-
ers, and they may inspire resentment on my own or on others' behalf. Offenses 
may be apparently victimless soc ial fouls. 
The category of offenses is vast but significant not only for that reason. It also 
reveals something about what can occasion resentment and thus about what can 
be at issue in it. People seethe and prickle with resentment at those who laugh 
too loudly, speak too freely, fail to say "please" or "thank you," or utter other conven-
tional formulas; at fashion fads, the piercing of body parts (now, other than ears), 
and weird haircuts/a at the yelps of other people's children and at people's sitting 
closer on a bench or bus than they must; and the list goes on and on. One 
explanation of many of these "offending" occasions given by William Miller is 
the enormous social importance of "disattendability," explored so acutely by soci-
ologist Erving Coffman, by which what is ordinary, routine, and normal generates 
"normative expectations" to which we hold people accountable, if only in the 
medium of untoward feelings like disgust, alarm, pity, contempt, embarrass-
ment-and, of course, resentment.Z1 Cases of offense or affront are revealing, for 
what we see in them is not a harm or injury in the usual sense but an occurrence 
construed as a threat either to a norm or familiar pattern imbued with some 
prescriptive force by the perceiver. 
In all cases of resentment, it seems we are angry because (we think) we or 
others are injured or because we are (we think justifiably) affronted by the actions 
of some who have gotten out of bounds. Someone has made free with what we 
thought were the rules, crossed boundaries we supposed intact, ignored claims we 
believed authoritative, or rendered idle or ridiculous our hope that things will go 
on in any of the many ways we believe they should. The sense of threat in resent-
ment, as Strawson claimed, tends to go to the agent's apparent malice or indiffer-
ence, when we suppose he or she might have shown the good will, attention, due 
care, respect, or understanding that would have led to proper behavior. In many 
cases, although perhaps not all, the proper will, care, or attitude is what we had 
expected to be shown; in all cases, we must think that it could have been. As 
Strawson noted, resentment is a feeling that impugns the agent and imputes re-
sponsibility, and so culpability, for some kind of wrong. There is threat both in a 
norm's being tested by overt noncompliance and in the presumption that the 
agent in getting out of bounds displays irresponsibility or worse. There can also 
be a threat to the resentful perceiver's sense of authority and competence as a 
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judge of what "is done" or "goes" or is acceptable "among us" if one 's resentment 
is not shared or its eliciting violation is not recognized by others. 
In cases of direct injury and insult, one is not so likely to be wrong in think-
ing that something unacceptable has occurred. But the case of offenses is again 
not only revealing but instructive as well. For in the case of offenses, many a 
resented behavior is seen as "out of bounds" not only in the absence of any actual 
injury, and even when the behavior is in no apparent way "aimed" at the one 
who resents it, but also when ill intent by the agent is undetectable by reasonable 
observers. These are the cases in which as onlookers we feel inclined to say to 
someone wrought up with resentment, "What's it to you?" This question is exactly 
the right one, for it requests an interpretation that at least specifies the transgres-
sion (what is wrong here, which may not be obvious to others) if not the faulty 
attitude it may seem to embody. One common resentful response, however, is 
also apt: "Who do they think they are to . .. ?" T his goes to the heart of the matter 
of resentment. The offender is taken to be "thinking" that he or she is exempt 
from some requirement he or she must or ought to know applies. Resentment 
carries this implication of a faulty attitude on the actor's part. 
This is a danger inherent in resentment. We may not have independent rea-
sons to believe people bear us ill will or are indifferent or careless when we find 
that what they do threatens our sense of a prevailing order, but it is very easy, and 
it seems very common, to translate one's own sense of threat back into an attribu-
tion of fault or malice in the intentions of others. Resentment embodies a sense, 
or an implicit and presumptive imputation, of fault that can be difficult to dis-
lodge, and one gripped by resentment may be far more disposed to find fault in 
others rather than to question whether one's own resentment might be misplaced 
or exaggerated. And it is also true that when people resent hearing "foreign" lan-
guages spoken, encountering people of racial or ethnic groups other than theirs 
in their neighborhood, or seeing evidence of gay and lesbian households, there is 
usually a prior belief that some kinds of people aren 't to be trusted or accepted to 
begin with, and the fact that people like that are intruding where they don't be-
long is additional evidence of their inappropriate presumption or aggressiveness . 
Those already resented are likely to arouse yet more resentment for behaving as 
if they don't know-and shouldn't they?-that they aren't the kind who belong. 
Whether it is correct or not in particular cases to infer that an agent's attitude 
is faulty, though, the central matter of resentment is an injury or affront that is 
threatening in disappointing expectations, or dimming or dashing hopes, for oth-
ers ' conduct that in some sense we think we had a "right" to n The best explana-
tion of that "right," I claim, is the belief in an operative norm of some kind, 
although not necessarily a moral norm. The huge category of resented offenses 
alone suggests that resentment should not be "moralized." What threatens is the 
license taken by some with what others of us take to be the operating understand-
ings, limits, or rules. In the case of injury or cruelty, for example, the sense of 
threat is urgent because actual harm is the result of an offender's failure to abide 
by or to be restrained by a norm, and more such harm might be forthcoming. Or 
if someone receives treatment inappropriate to his kind in a system carefully ar-
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ranged around appropriate responses to kinds of people, that rankles but also 
threatens those faithful to that system: where will this breakdown of order lead? 
This is as true when a murderer goes free on a technicality as when a member of 
a despised racial group is treated with respect. 
The threat that prompts resentment, made fully explicit, is of license with 
impunity. The transgression announces a possibility that is at least annoying, often 
alarming, or even fearsome-a possibility that might persist unless something fore-
closes it. So the fact of the transgression puts in question, even threatens, whatever 
confidence, trust, assurance, or hope allowed one to be unconcerned about such 
injuries or affronts or unburdened by their unsettling implications. This is the 
sense in which we "take personally" what we resent. It is not that what we resent 
necessarily is an injury or insult to us ourselves or even an affront aimed specifi-
cally at us. Rather transgressions against boundaries cause us concern when they 
announce the possibility of something we might have to reckon with -a factor 
that throws us uncomfortably out of our normative expectations, moral and other-
wise, or undermines our ability to assert with confidence what and where certain 
social, moral, or interpersonal boundaries lie. In that threat lies a potential for 
fear, as for other negative feelings, that can flavor resentment or compound it. 
Resentment is itself a "weapon" (using Butler's image)-an unpleasant, ac-
cusing, and potentially threatening response when expressed overtly at the of-
fender. When apparent to others, it is also, to continue the image, a kind of "call 
to arms ." Where there is opportunity and ability to get transgressors back within 
bounds, to impose some corrective action on them, or at the very least to summon 
support from others for a clear repudiation of what transgressors have done, resent-
ment may be relieved as the threat is diminished. It is something at least if the 
rules and boundaries are reiterated, even if the individual offenders go unpun-
ished and are no longer trustworthy. It is better, of course, if we can be assured 
that punitive treatment of transgressors serves as an informative and possibly deter-
ring example to others. It is best if those who have broken the rules can actually 
be brought to reaffirm their subscription to them. Yet often the opportunity or 
ability to correct offenders or to inflict reprisals on them is uncertain or unavail-
able. Worse, sometimes repudiation is not forthcoming from any others, from 
enough others, or from others with authority. Then the threat of license with 
impunity is fulfilled. In such cases, there is a basis for resentment at a transgres-
sion to turn disgusted, bitter, envious, shamed, or fearful. 
Resentment can be disgusted, for example, in a case in which one has ceased 
to be surprised at certain goings on and has given up any thought that one can 
forestall their occurrence or defend against them.1l Consider the situation of a 
lone female office clerk in a welding shop who has failed to become inured to 
pinup calendars and continuing sexual insults and challenges. If she no longer 
rises to the bait emotionally she might still disapprove of her coworkers' conduct. 
What is missing if she ceases to resent it? She might without any longer experienc-
ing resentment continue to disapprove of her coworkers' conduct and continue to 
believe that the norms that define it as rude, insulting, and hostile are valid and 
that her coworkers know very well that what they do is at least some of these 
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things. But if she still resents these goings-on - if she still gets angry about the 
wrong these goings-on inflict on her, or on women in general, and does not 
merely shrug and think, "It's not supposed to be that way, but who can do any-
thing about it?" -her resentment reveals that she continues, quite precisely, to 
"take it personally." The wrongfulness of their behavior gets a grip on her and 
moves her emotionally and motivationally in the direction of her own hostile 
display-a kind of accusing anger that puts her in the expressive position of rebuk-
ing them. Her resentment is that rebuke . 
But even if she feels resentment, she might not show it. Even though resent-
ment disposes her to show her anger in overt and confrontationally angry displays, 
actually showing anger in her situation may not be a sane or safe option. She may 
know that this leads to escalation or attracts reprisals. She may then find that her 
anger takes the form of a withdrawal or recoil in disgust from the situation. She 
might begin to experience her coworkers to some extent as a kind of noxious 
substance in the environment, rather than as fully fellow agents who can and 
should be confronted with their knowing misbehavior; she may also experience 
self-disgust at her own sense of powerlessness or her failure to recruit others to 
negative judgment or rectifying action. Her resentment may mingle with disgust, 
or disgust may simply replace it. Her resentment itself may move her in directions 
that in turn provoke other feelings that modify the expression and course of the 
resentment or perhaps cause resentment to give way to other, less stressful, costly, 
or defensive feelings, where active resistance isn't going anywhere.24 
Bitter resentment might similarly involve scenarios in which one cannot stop 
blaming some others for failing to supply at least a community of confirming 
judgment, if not actual protection, from injuries or affronts that one cannot or 
will not "learn to accept." Sometimes people are supposed to accept the treatment 
they protest, and sometimes they are supposed to accept the futility of their pro-
testing that treatment. People are called "bitter" who can't seem to stop complain-
ing, those whom others see as stuck in an accusation that is not (in the eye of 
the beholder) going to change anything. Those who find themselves increasingly 
isolated, justly or not, in their accusation may find that resentment acquires a 
brittle quality, less an accusing display than a kind of choked protest that already 
anticipates it will be ignored or refused by others. 15 
Resentment may mingle with envy when one repudiates what others do but 
at the same time wishes one had the power, nerve, or panache to get away oneself 
with what they do. This is the variation on resentment that Nietzsche's ressenti-
ment captures and inflates to mythic proportions. But although envious resent-
ment (or resentful envy) is real, it would be a mistake to think that all resentment 
involves envy. That would be to deny that anyone ever burns with anger at wrong-
doing without actually, perhaps secretly or unconsciously, wishing that one could 
get away with what wrongdoers do or could themselves have the attributes that 
make wrongdoers capable of violating norms. Resentment might invite shame 
when one wants to be able to express one's anger in a way that rebukes someone's 
behavior but is too timid or prudent or ingratiating to do so. The shame accompa-
nying resentment is more poignant, though, when one is invisible or so negligible 
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in others' eyes that the protest one's resentment reveals is beneath the notice or 
concern of others. It is easy to see how shamed resentment could breed envy: the 
miserably treated servant might rather be the tyrannical master, if those are the only 
positions available in certain social worlds. But it would be dangerous to assume 
that those oppressed or slighted necessarily yearn to turn the tables; often, they 
want to overturn those particular tables and level the ground for future relations. 
On my account of resentment, when people cease to resent things they once 
did it reveals some kind of resignation, a kind of "normative surrender." This 
might involve ceasing to believe that a norm is valid, losing expectations that a 
valid norm will be honored and letting go of a personal stake in that norm, or 
losing conviction that one is in a position to assert shared norms, or at least certain 
ones, with any effect. But when people continue to resent certain behavior even 
as they recognize that their normative investment is neither shared nor enforce-
able (at least locally), the residual resentment preserves and expresses a personal 
"normative stake," an insistence on the validity and importance of a norm, a repu-
diation of the prevailing situation of dereliction or insouciance, and so a continu-
ing normative protest of what exists in favor of what should be. They continue to 
take it personally. 
Resentment can also be fearful. The association of resentment with fear is 
common, as noted above, and with reason. Fear comes in with resentment espe-
cially in cases of (standing or passing) vulnerability and inadequate or unreliable 
defense-that is, when one does not expect one's resentment to constitute an 
effective accusing and restraining signal. Worse, in some weak positions, one 
might fear that one has invited additional harm or threat for having shown resent-
ment-a kind of anger- in response to the original harm or threat. In any case, 
fearful (and perhaps disgusted or bitter) resentment can involve second-order fear. 
It is bad to be injured or affronted, and so as a result to be under threat of, even 
in fear of, further injury or affront because what protected you from it is destroyed 
or in doubt. It is worse to see no way to reestablish security, for now you are afraid 
that you are going to have to be afraid, to live in fear, without assurance or protec-
tion of a community of shared boundaries that one 's fellows are willing to assert 
and enforce. Second-order fear is understandable in continuing situations of weak-
ness, including situations of continuing subordination by role or status. Members 
of oppressed, stigmatized, or despised groups are continuously vulnerable in such 
ways, across many social situations and encounters. Second-order fear might be 
one of the conditions in which resentment assumes a "roiling" or "gnawing" qual-
ity, an accusing anger that can't, because it must not, get "out" expressively. 
Resentment that is fearful feeds on exposure to injury in virtue of one's dem-
onstrated vulnerability or exposure to affront in view of the apparently negligible 
importance or authority of one's expectations or hopes . Yet I have argued that 
even resentment that is not fearful turns on a sense of threat. This suggests an 
explanation of why some injuries to others can excite resentment whether or not 
one "identifies" with those injured or offended. Indeed, it explains why the per-
ception of another's being injured or affronted can sometimes prompt identifica-
tion with him or her that was not there to begin with . In some cases the breach 
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of bounds that reveals the vulnerability of others causes us to recognize that we, 
too, are exposed and that we have something in common with them. If what 
threatens us is license with impunity, then those upon whom objectionable action 
is visited are not the only ones threatened, for the offender who will go beyond 
bounds could be a future menace or a dangerous example to others. In the case 
of victimless offense to presumed standards, the authority of the standards we rely 
on is jeopardized, and our confidence in proceeding on the basis of these stan-
dards, or even a hope that these standards will be respected, is undermined. In 
other cases we may feel that our group membership is threatened, either because 
we are no longer sure that our community is one whose operative standards we 
can accept or respect or because we feel defeated in our attempt to grasp and 
apply standards that are operative. Is a community that harbors or tolerates this 
sort of thing really one I can call mine? Or is my competence as a judge or the 
authority of the standards 1 assume are common put in question here? Am I "out 
of it"? There are significant resentments of alienation and marginality, in which 
one's protest simply places one outside serious consideration: one is an old fogie , 
a wacko, a malcontent, a whiner. 
Resentment as Moral Address 
To come back to the central point, whether or not resentment is further driven 
or infused by other feelings, it is a kind of accusing anger at something done. The 
anger is directed at the doer of what is out of bounds, with the implication that 
the doer knows, or ought to know, better. Does the anger of resentment have an 
aim? If expressions of resentment tend to playas protests, rebukes, or demands ("I 
resent that" or "How dare you/he/she?" or "There ought to be a law"), what satis-
faction does resentment seek? To ask this question is to assume that some emo-
tional responses have not only an etiology in certain perceptions but also an ex-
pressive point or communicative direction . Resentment seems to be one such 
emotion. Hampton claims that in resentment the victim "would have it" that rank 
and value are not lower or lowered because that is on her account what is threat-
ened. Butler seems to think that resentment seeks or threatens the punishment of 
the offending party in order "to remedy or prevent harm ."26 On my account, what 
resentment calls out for is assurance of protection, defense, or membership under 
norms brought in question by the exciting injury or affront. What can assuage resent-
ment of actual injury is renewed trust or hopefulness that people, including oneself, 
will be defended or protected. And what reassures us in the face of affront is confir-
mation that our sense of boundaries is shared; it is those who offend who are up for 
negative appraisal, rebuke, or exclusion, not we who will be ignored, ridiculed, or 
silenced. Now, to whom are resentment's rebukes or demands expressed? 
I have already mentioned Strawson's famous article on resentment and other 
reactive attitudes. Strawson considered resentment a "reactive attitude," and these, 
it has been pointed out, are a kind of moral address: they are expressive not only 
because they reveal something going on in the one who experiences them but 
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also because they are a kind of communicative display that invites a kind of re-
sponse .27 They address those at whom they are directed and often others, bidding 
them to recognize the existence or the possibility of a kind of relationship. In the 
case of resentment, the appeal or invitation for assurance of protection, defense, 
or membership might sometimes be addressed to the offender: The angry display 
"sends a message" to the offender about the unacceptability of the offender's be-
havior. This sort of case is what Butler had in mind, and it seems to be the 
response now characteristically read as indignation, overt rebuking anger. But the 
assumption that one's accusing and reproving anger and the possible reprisal it 
portends will be effective supposes one is in a position to accuse, reprove, and 
threaten the transgressor. Many of us in many situations are not in this position. 
When resentment is fearful because of vulnerability, fear would be the wrong 
message to address to an offender when the offense displays ill will or bold indif-
ference (rather than neglect), and so when the victim's fearful vulnerability might 
constitute exactly the wrong sort of invitation, that is, an invitation to further 
aggression, bad treatment, ridicule, or contemptuous flouting of rules. 
Yet insofar as resentment, like other reactive attitudes, can be read as a mes-
sage or signal, resentment's anger, even if fearful, is not unwisely addressed to 
others who are not the offender but who might be in some position to reaffirm 
standards and so ratify the resenter's judgment, to act in defense of the victim in 
the form of intervention or reprisal; or to protect the victim (and perhaps others, 
including themselves ) from repetitions of the injury. These are the responses that 
create or recreate the basis for confidence, trust, or hope that the boundaries that 
include and protect us are as we believe and need them to be. Seen in this way, 
the "aim" of resentment is, ideally, to activate protective, reassuring, or defensive 
responses in some individuals or community that can affirm the victim's being 
within the scope of that community's protective responsibilities or the resenter 's 
being in fact competent in grasping and applying the community's normative 
expectations. The transgressor can reassure by "getting the message" and respond-
ing with acceptance of rebuke or with apology or amends. Allies can reassure 
by joining in confirming or corrective action . The sought-for "answer" to being 
"addressed" in the mode of resentment is "be assured, trust again" or "be assured, 
we judge as you do." 
Commonly enough, however, resentment turns inward, festers or roils, and 
is not appropriately answered. So the association of resentment with the weak, 
with those whose vulnerability is confirmed by the fact of their exposure to harm, 
exploitation, demotions, and slights, is understandable. The weak will be in harm 's 
way precisely because their weakness invites predation or indifference. Worse, 
they look forward to living with injuries and slights and with the second-order fear 
of having always to be angry and afraid. A weak position-socially, whether struc-
tural or situational -portends that one's resentment is less likely to be "heard," or 
if heard to be answered. Alternatively, it is more likely when heard to attract 
reprisals or ridicule for its presumption rather than protection from what prompts 
it. The resentment of subordinates and victims can outrage their betters and tor-
mentors when it does not amuse them. An expression of resentment can invite 
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ridicule from those in a position to disqualify the one resenting as a judge. Not 
everyone is in a position to brandish Butler's weapon; the likely results of doing 
so, at any rate, are not a constant across situations or social positions. The seduc-
tive glimmer of truth about resentment in Nietzsche's account of ressentiment is 
that the weak might have to be "expert in silence, in long memory, in waiting, in 
provisional self-depreciation, and in self-humiliation."l8 Nietzsche was right to call 
this corrosively fearful anger "poisonous." Thwarted resentment can do damage. 
But it is easier to understand the nature and depth of the damage if we appreciate 
the degree to which resentment both expresses a sense of wrong and calls for 
recognition and a reparative response. 
I have argued here against limiting resentment to a response to actual injury, 
to specifically moral injury, or to injury to oneself Resentment functions as a 
reactive attitude for those who believe themselves or others injured or affronted, 
whether in fact they are and whether or not such injury or affront is morally 
objectionable. What is at stake in resentment is the mutual recognition of norms 
that define our society and our claims to membership in it. That is what begs to 
be examined when someone's resentment reveals a sense of threat. Of course, in 
particular cases resentment may be baseless, exaggerated, or misdirected, as other 
emotions can be in some instances. Even when it is, however, it serves as an 
extremely sensitive indicator and revealing expression of people's personal invest-
ment in what they understand to be, or what they believe should be, prevalent 
norms and people 's investment of some social patterns with normative force. Re-
sentment is not pleasant or attractive, but it has an important role to play in social 
and moral life, focusing our attention on the ongoing definition and enforcement 
of the standards of many types by which we live. 
Notes 
This essay has evolved through many presentations as part of a project on the moral 
psychology of responses to wrongdoing by victims, offenders, and third parties. I have 
presented versions at many places, and at every one I have received challenging feed-
back that moved me to reconsider and recast my claims. I thank audiences at the Uni-
versity of South Florida, State University of New York at Buffalo, Pennsylvania State 
University, Queens University, Dalhousie University, Syracuse University, University of 
Connecticut at Storrs, the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National 
University and Arizona State University. Special thanks to Peggy DesAutels, Robert 
Richardson, and Mitchell Haney, who steered me away from a mistake about resent-
ment and fear early on; and to Norvin Richards, whose commentary at a colloquium 
version of the paper at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Meeting was es-
pecially insightful and helpful. 
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